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Broadcast authentication is a fundamental security technology in wireless sensor networks (ab. WSNs). As an authentication
protocol, the most widely used in WSN, 𝜇TESLA protocol, its publication of key is based on a fixed time interval, which
may lead to unsatisfactory performance under the unstable network traffic environment. Furthermore, the frequent network
communicationwill cause the delay authentication for somebroadcast packetswhile the infrequent onewill increase the overhead of
key computation. To solve these problems, this paper improves the traditional 𝜇TESLA by determining the publication of broadcast
key based on the network data flow rather than the fixed time interval. Meanwhile, aiming at the finite length of hash chain and the
problem of exhaustion, a self-renewal hash chain based on Benaloh-Leichter secret sharing scheme (SRHC-BL SSS) is designed,
which can prolong the lifetime of network. Moreover, by introducing the queue theory model, we demonstrate that our scheme
has much lower key consumption than 𝜇TESLA through simulation evaluations. Finally, we analyze and prove the security and
efficiency of the proposed self-renewal hash chain, comparing with other typical schemes.
1. Introduction
We can imagine there will be thousands of sensors deployed
in the future space, but how can we ensure the security
of these sensors? Aside from confidential communications,
authentication is one of the essential services in security
protocols of wireless sensor networks (ab. WSNs) system [1].
If the authentication system stays defective or noneffective,
attackers may launch threats to the whole network such
as the wormhole attack, the man-in-the-middle attack, and
the multiple identities attack. Data leakage may occur even
in a military area, which can cause serious consequences.
Therefore, the study of authentication system especially
the broadcast authentication protocol for large-scale WSNs
still remains challenging. However, restrained by the finite
resources of WSNs, many previous protocols cannot be
directly applied to the broadcast authentication ofWSNs. For
example,most protocols rely on asymmetricmechanism such
as the public key cryptography, but thismechanism has heavy
communication, computation, and storage overhead, which
are impractical for WSNs.
Therefore, designing a protocol that can guarantee the
data integrity, confidentiality, and authentication in the
broadcast has been a popular research topic in WSNs. One
straightforward solution is to let the base station and all other
nodes share a common broadcast authentication key, but the
key will be disclosed if one of nodes is corrupt. Another
solution is to use one-time key for each packet so that the
leak of current key will not have a bad influence on the
following packets, but the cost of frequently updating keys
is unacceptable for WSNs. Perrig et al. proposed a classic
broadcast authentication protocol 𝜇TESLA [2], which has a
great improvement over the original protocol TESLA [3, 4].
The contribution of 𝜇TESLA protocol is to implement a
broadcast authentication process based on the symmetric key
mechanism instead of the asymmetric one, and it overcomes
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Figure 1: The broadcast authentication process of 𝜇TESLA.
the problems in traditional protocols by delaying the publi-
cation of one-way hash function key. This protocol decreases
the computational complexity for broadcast authentication
and improves the authentication efficiency as well. In the
following paragraph, wewill give a brief overview of𝜇TESLA.
The main idea of 𝜇TESLA is to broadcast a packet
authenticated by the key 𝐾mac at first and then publish 𝐾mac
so that there is no way to forge the broadcast packets before
the publication of the key. In addition, the protocol achieves
the secret sharing with the key generation algorithm shared
by the entire network. The one-way hash function and the
key chain mechanism can ensure the safety of keys and the
tolerance of packet loss. Figure 1 illustrates the broadcast
authentication process of 𝜇TESLA.
𝜇TESLA protocol consists of three phases: (1) securely
initializing the configuration of base station, (2) boot-
strapping the new receivers, and (3) authenticating the









) by one-way hash function in the
first phase and determines the synchronization time interval
𝑇int and the key-delayed-disclosure time interval 𝑑 × 𝑇int.
The synchronization time interval represents the lifetime of a
broadcast key, which means the broadcast packets sent from
the base station use the same key𝐾
𝑖
in a synchronous period
[𝑖 × 𝑇int, (𝑖 + 1) × 𝑇int]. The value of integer 𝑑 should make
𝑑×𝑇int longer than the time of packet-switching between the
base station and the farthest node so that all the nodes can
be ensured to have received the broadcast packet before the
corresponding key is disclosed.
When the new node joins the network, 𝜇TESLA dis-
tributes the key synchronized parameters and initialized
related keys to the new node based on the SNEP protocol [3].
For example, Figure 1 shows the process of node𝐴 requesting
to join the broadcast network during the time interval [𝑖 ×
𝑇int, (𝑖 + 1) × 𝑇int]. Consider
𝐴 󳨀→ 𝑆: (𝑁
𝐴
‖ 𝐷req)





















is a nonce which is generated by 𝐴 to achieve a
strong freshness authentication;𝐷req is a request data packet;
𝐾
𝐴𝑆





is an initial key; 𝑇
𝑖
is the starting time of the
current synchronization interval; 𝑇int is the synchronization
interval; and 𝑑 is the disclosure delay. The key will be
published after 𝑑 × 𝑇int.
After receiving a broadcast packet from the base station,
the receiver will judge the validity of authentication key based
on the synchronization time.The node will further verify the
key’s validity by running the hash calculation on it. Finally,
the node will use the key to authenticate the packets that have
been stored in the buffer during the time interval.
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In 𝜇TESLA protocol, the publication of key is dependent
on a specific time interval, which is fixed after initialization.
However, we notice that the current network traffic is not
stable in each time interval, and we divide this unstable traffic
into two cases:
(i) The base station broadcasts the packets frequently to
the sensor nodes. In this case, the broadcast packets
in one time interval will dramatically increase. If the
key is still disclosed according to the original time
interval, the excessive number of packets is unable to
get a timely authentication and the storage space of
the sensor nodes will be exhausted inevitably.
(ii) The base station just broadcasts a few packets in a
long time. In this case, it is possible that there are few
packets during the fixed time interval. Consequently,
the release of keys will lead to the increase of commu-
nication and computation overhead, which degrades
the efficiency of key chain.
To decrease unnecessary consumption aswell as to ensure
security in the process of broadcast authentication, in this
paper, we replace the fixed time interval with network traffic
to determine the publication of broadcast key. In other words,
the base station will not publish the authentication key unless
it has broadcasted a certain number of packets. And our
experiment has shown that some drawbacks of 𝜇TESLA can
be solved based on our mechanism.
Due to the one-way and lightweight characteristics, hash
chains have been widely applied to various scenarios such as
one-time password system [5], video stream security [6, 7],
micropayment protocol [8], key distribution scheme [9], and
broadcast authentication [10]. However, there is a trade-off
between the length and the efficiency of hash chain. The
exhaustion of the current hash chain will inevitably result in
producing another new hash chain initialized with the public
key cryptography. And this reinitialization will bring about
the extra overhead of the network.
Aimed at overcoming the inadequacies of the above
schemes, another concern of this paper is to design a novel
self-renewal one-way hash chain scheme based on Benaloh-
Leichter SSS (SRHC-BL).This scheme can effectively prolong
the lifetime of network and increase the tolerance of key loss.
Comparing with the typical self-renewal hash chain schemes,
our approach has the benefit of higher security and less
consumption of communication, computation, and storage.
Therefore, the main contribution of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
(1) A novel key distribution method based on data flow
instead of fixed time interval is proposed in order
to keep network stable in any situations. In addition,
some special cases are discussed as the supplement.
(2) A self-renewal one-way hash chain scheme based on
Benaloh-Leichter SSS is adapted for both keeping
extending life time of network and ensuring the
tolerance of key loss.
(3) Simulation experiments and theoretical analysis
based on queue model are conducted to compare
the storage cost and calculation complex among our
schemes and traditional 𝜇TESLA protocol. Conse-
quently, the result proves that our design achieves a
better performance.
2. Preliminary Knowledge
2.1. Basic Concepts of Queue Theory. Queue theory, also
known as random service system theory, is a theoretical basis
for the queuing problem. It is one of the interdisciplinary
theories of probability, statistics, and operational research.
Queuing phenomenon is composed of two aspects: demand
service and provide service. Here are four common queuing
models as follows: M/D/1/∞ queuing model, M/M/1/∞
queuing model, M/G/1/∞ queuing model, and G/G/1/∞
queuing model.
Queuing system has the following six features, which can
be applied to the broadcast authentication in WSNs:
(i) Input process, which characterizes and describes the
law of data packets coming to the random service
system.
(ii) Service time, namely, the time for the base station to
authenticate the data packets.
(iii) Waiter, namely, the base station.
(iv) Size of line determined by the number of customers
waiting to be served, which characterizes the number
of valid data packets to be processed by the base
station.
(v) Customer source, which corresponds to the data
packets.
(vi) Queue rule, determined by the detail of queuing
model.
2.2. Basic Concepts of Self-Renewal Hash Chain. In this
section, we introduce some basic concepts of SSS and the
definition of the Benaloh-Leichter SSS.
2.2.1. Concept of SSS. First, we formally define the necessary
monotone access structure.
Definition 1. Given a set 𝑃, a monotone access structure on 𝑃















, . . . , 𝑝
𝑛
}, and let an access structure 𝑍 defined on
𝑃 be comprised of a collection of subsets of𝑃.𝑍 is amonotone
access structure whenever 𝐴 ∈ 𝑍 and 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐴󸀠 ⊆ 𝑃.
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Similarly,𝑍-SSS is a method of generating (𝑆, (𝐼
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(1) for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝑍, finding the element 𝑆, given the set
{𝐼
𝑖
| 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴}, is easy,
(2) for any 𝐴 ∈ 𝑍, finding the element 𝑆, given the set
{𝐼
𝑖
| 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴}, is difficult.
The set 𝑍 is the authorized access structure or simply the
access structure, 𝑆 is the secret, and 𝐼
1
, . . . , 𝐼
𝑛
are the shares (or
the shadows) of 𝑆.The elements of the set𝑍 are the authorized
access sets of the scheme.
2.2.2. Benaloh-Leichter SSS
Definition 2. Let 𝑃 be a set. The set 𝑉 of variables indexed by
𝑃 is the set 𝑉 = {V
𝑝
: 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃}.
Definition 3. Given a monotone function 𝐹 on variables
indexed by a set 𝑃, the access structure defined by 𝐹 is the
set of subsets of 𝐴 of 𝑃 for which 𝐹 is true precisely when the
variables indexed by 𝐴 are set to be true.
It is clear that, for every monotone function 𝐹, the access
structure defined by 𝐹 is a monotone access structure.
Definition 4. For a given set 𝑃 and a monotone access
structure 𝑍 denoted by 𝑍min on 𝑃, define 𝐹(𝑍) to be the set
of monotone function on |𝑃| variables such that, for every
formula 𝐹 ∈ 𝐹(𝑍), the output of 𝐹 is true if and only if the
true variables in 𝐹 correspond exactly to a set 𝐴 ∈ 𝑍.
Note that 𝐹, 𝐹󸀠 ∈ 𝐹(𝑍) implies 𝐹 and 𝐹󸀠 denote the
same function. They may, however, use entirely different
expressions to express this function.
The formula can be expressed using only ∧ operator and
∨ operator, and it is sufficient to indicate how to “split” the
secret with these operators.
Definition 5. One can recursively define the share of a secret
































where based on Definitions 1, 2, and 3, selecting the specific
integer 𝑛 and 𝑍min, for the case 𝐹 = 𝐹1 ∧ 𝐹2 ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ 𝐹𝑛, one





, . . . , 𝑠
𝑘
corresponding to the secret 𝑆, and
then every distinct share is assigned to each 𝐼
𝑖







, 𝑖) ∈ Shares (𝑆, 𝐹)}, for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, where 𝐹 is an
arbitrary formula in the set 𝐹
𝐴
.
2.2.3. Definition of Hash Chain






𝑘, it takes 𝑠 as an input, and the
output is a bit string 𝑓
𝑛
(𝑠) of length 𝑛. In 𝑓
𝑛
(𝑠), 𝑠 is generated
randomly from a pseudo-random string generator. One-way













3.1. The Key Distribution Algorithm Based on Data Flow.
Compared with the traditional 𝜇TESLA protocol which
releases keys based on the fixed time interval, our approach
releases keys according to the data flow based on the queue
theory and the renewable hash chain.
3.1.1. Assumptions
(i) 𝜇TESLA protocol is as follows:
(1) the packet transmission time between the base
station and the farthest node is 𝑇max;
(2) the base station releases the key every 𝑇int by a
fixed time interval;
(3) the delay time of key publication is 𝜎 × 𝑇int, and
it satisfies the condition that 𝜎 × 𝑇int > 𝑇max;





𝑖 + 𝜎 − 1, where 𝑇
𝑐
is the current time, Δ is the
maximum clock difference, 𝑇
1
is the start time,
and 𝑖 is the 𝑖th interval time.
(ii) The improved broadcast authentication protocol
based on the queue theory and the renewable hash
chain is as follows:
(1) the maximum speed (or frequency) for the base
station to send packets is 𝑉
𝑠max
;
(2) the maximum transmission speed (or fre-
quency) in WSNs is 𝑉
𝑡max
;
(3) the communication radius of the base station is
𝑅bs;
(4) the base station releases the authentication key
every𝑁int packets based on data traffic;
(5) the delay of data flow of key publication is𝑁int+











is the identification number
of packets that is currently received,𝑁
1
is the ID
number of first packet received, and 𝑖 is the 𝑖th
time interval of data flow.
3.1.2.The Process of KeyDistribution Based onData Flow. The
process of broadcast authentication based on queue theory
and renewable hash chain is shown in Figure 2. Comparing
with Figure 1, we can see the difference between 𝜇TESLA and
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Figure 2: The process of broadcast authentication based on queue theory.
ours; 𝜇TESLA maps the key distribution to the time domain,
while ours maps the key distribution to the flow domain.
3.1.3. Several Cases to Discuss
Case 1. If the base station has not broadcasted a packet after a
long period, and the number of packets broadcasted has not
achieved a certain threshold, the base station will not release
the key during this long period, which disables the node to
authenticate the buffered packets. In this case, we can set a
time threshold 𝑇 (𝑇 is the upper bound of broadcast key
lifetime). So after time𝑇, the base station is required to release
key no matter whether the condition is satisfied.
Case 2. It is very common to have packet loss in WSNs.
Consider the following case: the base station will not send
packets in a long period and thus the key for the next round
will not be released either, but unfortunately, at this time, one
node lost the current authentication key, which implies that
this node cannot authenticate the remaining packets in the
buffer any more. In terms of this case, we set the interval
time 2𝑇 for the node to wait, where 𝑇 is the upper bound
of broadcast key lifetime. If the waiting time exceeds 2𝑇, the
node can send the request message to the base station for the
key of current round.
Case 3. Synchronization problem: how do we know which
packet should be authenticated by which type of key? We use
the counting mechanism to solve this problem. That is, the
broadcast packet sent by the base station is counted from 0 to
𝑁 and authentication key is also numbered from 0 to 𝑁 so
that we can create the relations between the packet and the
key by simply mapping.
3.2. A Self-Renewal Hash Chain Based on Benaloh-Leichter
SSS. In this section, we propose a novel self-renewed hash
chain based on Benaloh-Leichter SSS. This scheme has
three phases: the hash chain initial phase, the hash chain
usage phase, and the hash chain extension phase. Let 𝐶
and 𝑅 denote communication initiator and the recipient,
respectively.
3.2.1. Initial Phase. In the initial phase, 𝐶 and 𝑅 are synchro-
nized in time, and there is a maximum error time denoted as
Δ; 𝑅 can reject the message which exceeds the timeΔ plus the
acceptable transmission delay.
(1) The initiator 𝐶 generates an initial random value 𝑠 as
the seed of the first hash chain, and then 𝐶 uses the
preloaded hash function to compute 𝑛 hash value of












(2) Then, 𝐶 selects 𝑍min based on Benaloh-Leichter SSS
and a new random value 𝑠󸀠 to generate 𝑛 hash value of
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(3) Therefore, according to the Benaloh-Leichter SSS, 𝐶
takes ℎ𝑛(𝑠󸀠) as the secret 𝑆, divides it into 𝑛 parts as
the set 𝑉, and then defines the set 𝐹(𝑍) as the set
of formula on set 𝑉. Further, we select an arbitrary
formula 𝐹 in the set 𝐹
𝐴
. In this case, according to
𝑍min we can obtain Shares (𝑆, 𝐹) of the secret 𝑆. Thus,
the shares corresponding to the secret 𝑆 in the access








(1) Before the usage phase, 𝐶 and 𝑅 have confirmed
the initial time 𝑇
0
, and meanwhile the value ℎ𝑛(𝑠)
and the hash function have been preloaded in 𝑅







). During the usage phase, the
hash value is used from ℎ𝑛−1(𝑠) (firstly) to 𝑠 (finally)




Δ (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛).
(2) In the time 𝑇
0
+ Δ, 𝐶 releases the Msg
1
and its
corresponding message authentication code MAC
1

















(𝑠) ⊕ 𝐼2) .
(7)























is the content of current message and
MAC
𝑖
is used to verify MAC
𝑖−1
.




, 𝑅will calculate the difference between the
last time of receiving packets and the current time of
receiving packets. If the difference has not exceeded
Δ, 𝑅 will carry out the following steps:
(a) Compute and verify whether ℎ(ℎ𝑛−𝑖(𝑠)) is equal
to ℎ𝑛−𝑖+1(𝑠), where ℎ𝑛−𝑖+1(𝑠) is the valid hash
value stored in the last process. If it is equal, 𝑅
saves it.












On the other hand, if the difference exceeds Δ,




; then it will
wait until the next authentication process, which is
assumed as the 𝑗th authentication where 𝑖 < 𝑗;
(b) compute and verify whether ℎ𝑗−𝑖+1(ℎ𝑛−𝑗(𝑠)) is equal to
ℎ
𝑛−𝑖+1
(𝑠), where ℎ𝑛−𝑖+1(𝑠) is the valid hash value stored
in the last process; if it is equal, 𝑅 saves it;





; if all checks are valid, 𝑅 verifies 𝐶
successfully and then stores the shadow 𝐼
𝑖
.
The hash chain usage phase has a detailed description in
𝜇TESLA. If the hash chain is exhausted, the protocol goes into
the hash chain extension phase.
3.2.3. Extension Phase. When one hash chain has been
exhausted, 𝑅 has stored 𝑛 shadows 𝐼
𝑖
. One thing we need to
notice is that even though the number of shadows that 𝑅 has
stored is less than 𝑛 (as long as the number is not less than 𝑘),
we can still recover the final secret 𝑆.The detailed description
is as follows.




, . . . , 𝐼
𝑛
, we can easily
deduce Shares(𝑆, 𝐹) corresponding to the secret 𝑆
with the (𝑘, 𝑛)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
(2) With the Shares(𝑆, 𝐹), we can simply recover the
secret 𝑆. In other words, we have obtained the tail of
the next hash chain ℎ𝑛(𝑠󸀠). Then, a new hash chain
can be applied in the right way, and we can use the
same protocol in the next hash chain in order to
achieve the purpose of self-renewed one.
Therefore, this protocol provides an on-demand hash
chain extension without exhaustion, so the hash chain is able
to work smoothly and infinitely.
4. Performance Analysis
4.1. The Key Distribution Algorithm Based on Data Flow. (1)
Our algorithm releases the keys based on the data flow instead
of the original timeline and takes full account of the uneven
distribution of arrival of the packets in the network.
(2) Valid packets simulation in the 𝜇TESLA protocol:
many simulation techniques in [11, 12] are introduced to
wireless sensor networks to help researchers to understand
the behavior of the network which is hard to capture in situ.
In this paper, we use Matlab to simulate the four queuing
models of M/D/1/∞, M/M/1/∞, M/G/1/∞, and GI/G/1/∞,
respectively. We take the base station as the waiter and the
broadcast packets as the customer source, so the service time
obeys the distribution of the packets to be processed and
broadcasted by the base station and customer source obeys
the distribution of arrival of packets. By considering practical
situations, we give an example of packets arriving intensively.
The arrival of data packets of M/D/1/∞, M/M/1/∞, and
M/G/1/∞ obeys Poisson distribution with the randomly
selected parameter 𝜆 = 0.5, while GI/G/1/∞ obeys the
general random distribution. We set a fixed time interval 𝑇int
as 60 s and the numbers of valid packets 𝑁str in 𝑇int as 20,
and the simulation time was half an hour. If the number is
over 20, we would consider it as invalid one. There are two
reasons for that. First, overly late authentication would cause
the large storage overhead caused by the accumulated packets
in the node buffer. Second, the message is more likely to be
vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks. It can also be proved
that the conclusions of simulation experiments will not
change by altering the values of parameters such as 𝜆 and𝑇int.
Journal of Sensors 7






















Figure 3: Packets of M/D/1.
(3) Simulation comparison of key packets consumed: we
useMatlab to simulate the four queuingmodels ofM/D/1/∞,
M/M/1/∞, M/G/1/∞, and GI/G/1/∞, respectively, and we
take the example of packets arriving sparsely. (a) The arrival
of packets of M/D/1/∞ obeys the Poisson distribution with
parameter 𝜆 = 0.1 and the service time obeys the uniform
distribution with a fixed value 𝑡 = 1 s. (b) The arrival of
packets of M/M/1/∞ obeys the Poisson distribution with
parameter 𝜆 = 0.1 and the service time obeys the Poisson
distribution with parameter 𝜇 = 20. (c)The arrival of packets
of M/G/1/∞ obeys the Poisson distribution with parameter
𝜆 = 0.1 and the service time obeys the general random
distribution. (d) The arrival of packets of GI/G/1/∞ and the
service time obey the general random distribution. We set a
fixed time interval 𝑇int = 60 s, and the data flow interval is
𝑁int = 20; the simulation time was ten hours.
(i) In terms of the intensive rate of packets arrival, based
on the fixed time interval, the simulation results
of valid data packets, dropped packets, and total
packets for 4 queuing models M/D/1/∞, M/M/1/∞,
M/G/1/∞, and GI/G/1/∞ are shown in Figures 3–6,
respectively.
(ii) In terms of the sparse rate of packets arrival, we draw
a comparison between 𝜇TESLA (based on the fixed
interval) and our protocol (based on the data flow).
The simulation results of key consumption for 4 queu-
ing models M/D/1/∞, M/M/1/∞, M/G/1/∞, and
GI/G/1/∞ are shown in Figures 7–10, respectively.
From Figures 3–6, we notice that the intensive rate of
broadcast packets will cause the packets to be cached in the
nodes and unable to be authenticated timely, which eventu-
ally results in the loss of packets. Also, the probability of






















Figure 4: Packets of M/M/1.






















Figure 5: Packets of M/G/1.
choosing plaintext attack will become large if the number of
packets exceeds the threshold𝑁str.
Furthermore, from Figures 7–10, the key consumption of
our proposal is much lower than that of 𝜇TESLA. Conse-
quently, the life cycle of the key chain would be prolonged,
and the network overhead would be reduced.
(4)The calculation complexity of the proposed algorithm
is low. From Figures 1 and 2, we can find that there is no
fallback process in both 𝜇TESLA protocol and our algorithm.
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Figure 6: Packets of GI/G/1.


















Figure 7: Keys consumption of M/D/1.
Although different network environments can contribute to
different consumption of calculation, the proposed algorithm
and 𝜇TESLA both keep 𝑂(𝑛), where 𝑛 is the number of hash
calculations during authentication processes. However, in the
protocol of multilevel 𝜇TESLA [13], repeated hash operations
are conducted to guarantee life time of keys at the expense
of large amounts of calculations. For instance,𝑚 denotes the
time of high-level calculation while 𝑛 denotes that of low-
level calculation in a 2-level 𝜇TESLA process, which leads
to 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑛 times of calculation. When 𝑛 = 𝑚, the complexity
achieves𝑂(𝑛2); the order ofmagnitudes increases sharply and



















Figure 8: Keys consumption of M/M/1.


















Figure 9: Keys consumption of M/G/1.
contributes to high calculation complexity if 𝑛 becomes large.
The variation tendency can be seen in Figure 11.
4.2. A Self-Renewal Hash Chain Based on Benaloh-Leichter
SSS. In this section, we will present the security and perfor-
mance analysis of the proposed hash chain in Section 3.
4.2.1. Security. The security of this scheme is based on
one-way function and Benaloh-Leichter SSS. The purpose
of XOR with hash value is to maintain the integrity and
confidentiality of shadows. And the purpose of delaying key
publication is to achieve nonrepudiation.
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Figure 10: Keys consumption of GI/G/1.



























The value of n
Proposed algorithm and 𝜇TESLA
2-level 𝜇TESLA
Figure 11: The calculation of three algorithms.
Meanwhile, Benaloh-Leichter SSS can efficiently generate
a much richer family of access structures than the current
schemes, and it is convenient to view an access structure as
a function. Any monotone Boolean function over 𝑛 variables
can be computed by a monotone formula. Thus, every access
structure can be realized by the scheme of Benaloh-Leichter
SSS. On the other hand, for every set that does not belong to
the access structure, the elements in the set do not have any
information on 𝑠
𝑖
; hence they will not reveal any information
about secret 𝑆.
Also in the phase of authentication, the tolerance of
packet loss or fault is embodied in our proposal. However,
in Benaloh-Leichter SSS, even some 𝑠
𝑖
was dropped or lost;
secret 𝑆 can still be verified by other valid 𝑠
𝑖
as long as the
number of shadows is not less than 𝑘.
Moreover, dual authentication in our scheme can
strengthen the security and integrity. The first authentication
is that whether ℎ𝑛−𝑖(𝑠) and 𝐼
𝑖
are received in a valid interval
and they will not be stored unless both of them are verified
correctly. And the second authentication is to judge whether
ℎ
𝑛−𝑖
(𝑠) is valid according to ℎ𝑛−𝑖+1(𝑠) which has been stored
in the first authentication and whether 𝐼
𝑖
is valid by the
exclusive-OR function. The shadow 𝐼
𝑖
will be accepted only
if the packet passes the dual authentication.
Finally, our self-renewal hash chain has satisfactory confi-
dentiality.However, the shadow 𝐼
𝑖
exists in the packetwith the
form of plaintext and the attacker can obtain the key shadow
information by snooping the packet. However, the attacker
is unlikely to recover the secret 𝑆 unless he or she can get
more than 𝑘 pieces of shadow, which obviously increases the
difficulty. And even though the attacker can finally recover
the secret 𝑆, he or she is still unable to produce the fake broad-
cast packets to play the role of the base station. The reason is
that the secret 𝑆, namely, ℎ𝑛(𝑠󸀠), is the tail of the next hash
chain, which can only be used to authenticate the subsequent
keys. And due to one-way feature of the hash function, the
attacker cannot generate ℎ𝑛−1(𝑠󸀠), ℎ𝑛−2(𝑠󸀠), . . . , 𝑠󸀠, so he or she
is unable to fake the packet to deceive other sensor nodes. If
the attacker does, these nodes can easily detect the validity of
packets with ℎ𝑛(𝑠󸀠).
4.2.2. Complexity. In this part, we will analyze the perfor-
mance of our proposal. Before that, we first define some
parameters which are mentioned as follows:
𝑚: the output of hash function which is an 𝑚-bit
string,
𝑛: the length of hash chain,
𝑖: the number of secret shadows in SRHC-BL,
𝑀: the computation consumption of the hash func-
tion,






󸀠 : the computation consumptions of gener-
ating a random number in RHC, ERHC, and SUHC
(or SRHC), respectively,
𝐴,𝐴󸀠: the computation consumption of obtaining one
bit from a random number by hard core predicate in
SUHC and SRHC, respectively,
𝐶, 𝐼, 𝑃: the computation consumption of obtaining








𝐸: the computation consumption of XOR,
𝐿
𝑀




: the communication or memory consumption of
the seed of hash chain,
𝐿
𝑟
: the communication or memory consumption of
the generated random number,
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𝐿
𝐼






: the communication or memory consumption of
the secret shadows 𝑠
𝑖
in SRHC-BL.
Then, we compare the computation, communication,
and storage cost of our scheme SRHC-BL with the current
schemes RHC, ERHC, SUHC, and SRHC. The comparison
results are shown as follows.
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+ 5𝑛 + 5𝑚 + 5 ⌊log
2
𝑚⌋ + 5) ⋅ 𝑀
+ 2 (𝑚 + ⌊log
2
𝑚⌋ + 1) ⋅ 𝑅 + 2𝑁.
(15)
Communication:
2 (𝑛 + 𝑚 + ⌊log
2
𝑚⌋ + 1) ⋅ 𝐿
𝑀








(𝑛 + 3𝑚 + ⌊log
2
𝑚⌋ + 1) ⋅ 𝐿
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+ 𝑚 × (1 + 2𝐿
𝑟
) . (17)






















+ (3 + 𝑚) 𝐿𝑀 + 𝑚. (20)






+ 7𝑛 − 2)𝑀 + 2𝑛𝐸 + 𝑛 (𝐼 + 𝑃) + 𝐶. (21)
Communication:
(4𝑛 − 2) ⋅ 𝐿𝑀 + 2𝑛 ⋅ 𝐿𝐼. (22)
Storage:
(𝑛 + 3) ⋅ 𝐿𝑀 + 𝑛 ⋅ 𝐿𝐼 + 𝑖 ⋅ 𝐿𝑒 + 2𝑚. (23)

















, so that it is easy to know the performance
of our SRHC-BL relative to RHC, ERHC, SUHC, and SRHC.
Through comparison, we can draw the following conclusion:
the consumption of SRHC-BL in the initialization phase is
much less than other schemes, while, in the phase of key
distribution and authentication, SRHC-BL’s consumptions of
communication and storage are a little more than SRHC’s but
much less than RHC’s, ERHC’s, and SUHC’s.
5. Related Work
5.1. Improved 𝜇TESLA Protocol. Many hybrid broadcast
authentication protocols have been proposed. Reference [14]
proposed a broadcast authentication protocol with Bloom
Filter compression to mainly reduce error rate of data broad-
casting. Reference [15] introduced a multiuser broadcast
authentication protocol to synchronously meet the require-
ments of multiuser. A lightweight secure authentication
protocol was proposed in [16], which mainly focuses on
the storage performance optimization. Reference [17] is a
𝜇TESLA-like scheme based on symmetric keys, but the
signature takes a large storage cost. A secure protocol named
GPLD (Global Partition, Local Diffusion) was proposed
in [18]; this scheme based on the symmetric encryption
system and the geographical location information allows the
different multicast group to exist in wireless sensor networks,
and nodes can also act as the broadcast source and relay. On
the basis of [18, 19] a broadcast authentication scheme based
on users, which achieves the promising security, scalability,
and performance, was proposed. Reference [13] proposes an
enhanced broadcast authentication protocol based on multi-
level 𝜇TESLA, however, whose overhead has not achieved the
satisfactory efficiency. Reference [20] put forward a broadcast
authentication scheme with the Merkle tree; although it can
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effectively resist the DoS attacks, the authentication delay
seems to be inappropriate for most applications. Taking the
tolerance of data loss into account, [21] presents a link-layer
packet recovery algorithm which improves the reliability and
minimizes the latency.
So we can see that 𝜇TESLA protocol and its improved
protocols are the mainstream of broadcast authentication
protocol research in wireless sensor networks.
5.2. Reinitializable Hash Chain. Hash function has the char-
acteristics of one-wayness and high computational efficiency.
Therefore, the hash chain mechanism has been widely used
into many encryption applications and services. Further-
more, the length of the hash chain is limited, which makes
it difficult to meet the requirement of sustainability. And
extending the length of the hash chain is difficult because a
secure channel established through other encryption mecha-
nisms is needed, and a large overhead is required.
To solve this contradiction, researchers have proposed
some hash chain schemes. Goyal introduced the reinitializ-
able hash chain (RHC) scheme with the idea that a fire-new
RHC will be regenerated safely and undeniably when the old
RHC is exhausted. On the basis of RHC, [22] put forward the
elegant reinitializable hash chain (ERHC) scheme, which uses
the one-way hash function to regenerate the hash chain safely
and infinitely instead of using the public key mechanism.
However, due to the publication part of 𝑆
𝑈
to authentication
for the next seed of hash chain, it is likely to be susceptible to
the chosen plaintext attack. Reference [23] proposed the self-
updating hash chain (SUHC) scheme based on the hard core
predicate algorithm.The solution of SUHC is that the sender
distributes the first chain’s every key value with one bit in the
seed of second. In such a way, while the first one is exhausted,
the receiver would receive all bits of second chain’s seed.
On the basis of [23, 24] the self-renewal hash chain (SRHC)
scheme was proposed. The main difference between the
above two schemes is the generation method of the random
numbers.The security distributions of the seed of SUHC and
SRHC rely on the security distribution of 𝑘 randomnumbers,
where 𝑘 denotes the length of chain. Furthermore, these two
schemes require all the received random numbers to satisfy
integrity and inevitability. And then the seed of a new chain
can be reconstructed. However, both of them have given up
the original fault tolerance of hash chain. Based on SUHC,
[25] put forward a novel self-updating hash chain (NSUHC)
scheme; afterwards, according to NSUHC, [26] proposed
a new self-updating hash chain based on erasure coding
(SUHC-EC). In the former scheme, the seed of a new hash
chain is transformed from 𝑘-dimensional to 𝑛-dimensional
(𝑘 < 𝑛) and the latter one is transformed from one-
dimensional to 𝑛-dimensional.Therefore, two schemes select
one of the 𝑛 random values to release without repeating. The
new seed can be resumed after 𝑘 times. These two schemes
seem to realize the renewable hash chain, but actually there
is no difference from the conventional hash chain. Reference
[27] proposed a new self-updating hash chain based on
fair exchange idea (SRHC-FEI); this scheme uses one-time
signature key to encrypt the first bit of the seed of a new hash
chain in transmissionwhen releasing the new hash value each
time. It can enhance the security and fairness, but it inevitably
increases the system time delay. After analysis, we can see that
this scheme is also an enhanced scheme more than a strict
hash chain renewable construction scheme.
From the analysis of the above typical schemes we can
see that they all transform every bit of the new chain’s seed
into a random number andmake the security of the new seed
dependent on the security of distributed random numbers.
Besides, they can successfully regenerate the new seed only
when they receive all the random numbers correctly. As a
result, they all weaken the security and increase the consump-
tions for reinitialization. On the other hand, NSUHC and
SUHC-EC only expand the dimension of the seed of a new
hash chain, but compared with RHC and ERHC and so forth,
they increase the chance of encountering the man-in-the-
middle attack. Above all, from a perspective of application of
a hash chain, only RHC, ERHC, SUHC, and SRHC belong to
the renewable construction scheme of hash chain.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel secret key release scheme
based on the data flow, which addresses some problems
of traditional key release schemes based on the fixed time
interval, effectively improves the efficiency of the utilization
of keys, prolongs the life cycle of hash chain, and reduces the
network communication overhead and computational cost.
Moreover, we consider the scenario that when the num-
ber of packets using the same key to authenticate is greater
than the threshold 𝑁str, it may disable some packets to get a
timely authentication and thus results in the loss of data. Also,
the probability of chosen plaintext attack will be increased.
To solve these problems, we introduce the flow threshold
mechanism to prevent the attacks and enhance network
security as well.
After that we put forward a new renewable hash chain
based on Benaloh-Leichter SSS (SRHC-BL). The renewable
process can be executed infinitely. And we have theoretically
proved that SRHC-BL has better performance on integrity,
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation by adopting the delay
disclosure and one-wayness. In addition, our scheme can
also tolerate message loss or fault due to the property of
the shadows in Benaloh-Leichter SSS. Furthermore, the dual
authentication and transformed secret shadows enable our
scheme to have higher security than other schemes. Finally,
the analysis of complexity has proved that SRHC-BL has less
consumption than those typical schemes.
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